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CRIMINOLOGY
LIBERATION RECONSIDERED:
UNDERSTANDING WHY JUDGES AND
JURIES DISAGREE ABOUT GUILT
AMY FARRELL * & DANIEL GIVELBER**.
A criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial is premised
in part on the view that a jury’s verdict of guilt or innocence may differ
from that of a judge deciding the same case.
Empirical research has confirmed that judges and juries do sometimes
disagree about verdicts and that the direction of these disagreements is
overwhelmingly in the direction of jury leniency. In their seminal study,
The American Jury, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel suggested that when
cases are close on the evidence, juries are “liberated” from the dictates of
the law, and can—and do—give expression to extralegal values in arriving
at verdicts. This explanation feeds the commonly held view that judges
decide according to legal rules, but juries make decisions that reflect the
values and sentiment of the community, even when those decisions are in
opposition to the law. This perspective has been supported by research
primarily based on the perceptions of judges about how juries reach their
verdicts. Missing from our understanding of why judges and juries
disagree is information from jurors about the factors that motivate their
*

Amy Farrell, Ph.D., Law, Policy, and Society, Northeastern University, 2001; M.A.,
Sociology, University of Delaware, 1997; B.A., Beloit College, 1995. Assistant Professor,
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice Northeastern University. Professor Farrell’s
research focuses on the administration and legitimacy of justice institutions with primary
emphasis on measuring the effect of race and gender in police, prosecution. and adjudication
practices.
**

Daniel Givelber, J.D., Harvard Law School, 1964, B.A. Harvard College, 1961.
Professor Givelber served as dean of Northeastern University School of Law from 1984 until
1993, and was interim dean during the 1998–1999 academic year. He is an expert in the
areas of criminal law, criminal procedure and capital punishment, and has been engaged in
pro bono death penalty litigation for many years.

1549

1550

FARRELL & GIVELBER

[Vol. 100

verdicts in opposition to judges. Data collected in four jurisdictions by the
National Center for State Courts allows us to examine the question of judge
and jury disagreement about guilt through a consideration of the views of
jurors as well as judges. Using this data, we test in a modern context the
hypothesis that the jury’s embrace of values—as opposed to its different
assessment of the evidence—explains why juries acquit when judges would
convict. We find that legal and extralegal factors affect both judge and jury
decisions about guilt, that both sets of factors predict disagreement in
different contexts, and the pattern of agreement versus disagreement is
more complex than suggested by the liberation hypothesis.
I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutional right to a jury trial rests upon values in addition to
the interest of accurate fact-finding. When, at the height of the due process
revolution, the Supreme Court confronted the question of whether the
United States Constitution required states to afford criminal defendants the
right to a jury trial in a serious case, the Court did not base its ruling on the
view that juries were more accurate fact-finders than judges. 1 Rather, as it
noted in Duncan v. Louisiana, the constitutional right to a jury trial in a
serious criminal case reflected
a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice
administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent
oppression by the Government . . . . If the defendant preferred the common-sense
judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the
single judge, he was to have it. 2

The Court in Duncan found support for its view in empirical research on
judge and jury decisionmaking. Responding to the objection that “juries are
incapable of adequately understanding evidence or determining issues of
fact, and that they are unpredictable, quixotic, and little better than a roll of
dice” 3 the Court referenced Kalven and Zeisel’s seminal study from The
American Jury, stating:
Yet, the most recent and exhaustive study of the jury in criminal cases concluded that
juries do understand the evidence and come to sound conclusions in most of the cases
presented to them and that when juries differ with the result at which the judge would
have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of the very purposes for
which they were created and for which they are now employed. 4

1
2
3
4

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 155–56.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 157 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966)).
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Analyzing survey responses from over 500 judges presiding over
3,000 criminal trials, Kalven and Zeisel concluded that when cases are close
on the evidence, juries are “liberated” from the dictates of the law, and
can—and do—give expression to extralegal values in arriving at verdicts.
No other work of social science relating to jury behavior has been as widely
cited or as approvingly referenced by courts.5 Kalven and Zeisel’s research
has been cited in twenty-five different Supreme Court decisions (as well as
more than 190 decisions of other courts) 6 as support for a proposition
concerning the behavior of juries. These citations are a tribute to the
eminence of the authors, and to the breadth and sweep of their empirical
and analytic work, as well as to the mostly reassuring message that judges
are bound by legal rules, but juries can and do make decisions that reflect
the values and sentiment of the community, even when those decisions are
in opposition to the law.
Kalven and Zeisel drew their conclusions about why juries disagreed
with judges entirely from survey responses from judges about their
perceptions as to why juries arrived at a different conclusion than they
would have in the same case.7 No attempt was made to verify that the
conclusions of the judge about why the jury arrived at its verdict were in
fact correct. Additionally, research for The American Jury was conducted
over fifty years ago at the dawn of the civil rights movement before the
composition of police forces, judges, and juries began to reflect more
accurately the race and gender of the general population. It was conducted
before DNA analysis exposed the vulnerability of previously uncontestable
convictions in serious cases. Their data also predated the constitutional
revolution in how courts conduct criminal adjudication. 8 The demographics
of defendants in felony courts have also changed substantially since the
time of Kalven and Zeisel’s study. 9 While more recent research on jury
5

Valerie Hans and Neil Vidmar, The American Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 323 (1991).
6
This is the result of a search of Westlaw on January 10, 2010 employing the inquiry
“Kalven w/3 of Zeisel."
7
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, 45–54.
8
Cases such as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at trial),
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront witnesses), Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 479 (1986) (illegality of race-based jury challenges), Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975) (holding that a jury must reflect a cross-section of community; cannot exclude
women as a class), In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose
exculpatory evidence), as well as Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), were all
decided after the Kalven and Zeisel survey.
9
In the cases examined by Kalven and Zeisel, 73% of all defendants were white and the
remaining 27% were black. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 195 tbl.60. As of 2002, the
felony defendants in the seventy-five largest counties in U.S. were 31% white, 43% black,

1552

FARRELL & GIVELBER

[Vol. 100

decisionmaking has generally supported the notion that the liberation
hypothesis is “alive and well” in modern courts, 10 no studies have directly
measured whether sentiments as reported by jurors explain judge–jury
disagreements, and whether the effect of juror sentiment are most
pronounced in cases where the evidence is close.
Contemporary data from a four-city survey of criminal trials collected
by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) affords an opportunity to
advance our understanding of judge–jury disagreement beyond Kalven and
Zeisel’s original findings. 11 Despite the dramatic changes in the American
criminal justice system cited above, research using the NCSC data has
found essentially the same rates of judge–jury disagreement as those
identified by Kalven and Zeisel,12 but important questions remain
unanswered about the factors contributing to judge–jury disagreement about
guilt. The NCSC data includes information from both jurors who decided a
case and the judge who presided over the trial, which allows us to
investigate whether, and to what extent, the jury’s embrace of non-legal
factors explains why judges and juries disagree about guilt in a modern
context.
II. EXPLAINING JUDGE AND JURY DISAGREEMENT
In The American Jury, Kalven and Zeisel reported that when judges
and juries disagreed, juries were far more likely to be lenient than judges.
The authors identified three types of disagreements between judge and jury:
(a) disagreement as to whether the defendant was guilty of any of the
crimes for which he was on trial (66% of all disagreements), (b)
disagreements between the judge and jury as to whether the defendant was
guilty of some of the crimes with which he was charged (17% of all
disagreements), and (c) disagreements between judge and jury in which the
jury hangs as to one or more of the charges against the defendant (17% of
all disagreements).13 Each disagreement was in the same direction: the jury
24% Hispanic, and 2% “other.” BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2002, at 454 tbl.5.52 (2002), available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5522002.pdf. The percentage of defendants who are
either female or under twenty-one has at least doubled: from 7% women in the 1950s to 18%
in 2002, and from 9% of defendants who were twenty or younger in the 1950s to 18% in
2002. Id.
10
For a review see Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical
Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 700–01 (2001).
11
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge–Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial
Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171
(2005).
12
Id. at 180–83.
13
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 109.
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was far more likely to be more lenient than the judge. Thus, in 87% of the
disagreements about guilt or innocence, the jury was more lenient than the
judge was, and in 79% of the disagreements arising from a hung jury, the
jury was more lenient than the judge. 14
Relying solely upon the judge’s written explanation for why the jury
arrived at a verdict with which he disagreed, Kalven and Zeisel identified
five different explanations for disagreement. They cited “evidence factors,”
“facts only the judge knew,” “disparity of counsel,” “jury sentiment about
the individual defendant,” and “jury sentiments about the law.” 15
Weighting these factors, Kalven and Zeisel concluded that differing
evaluations of the evidence accounted for 54% of all disagreements,
sentiments about the law and the defendant for another 40%, and facts that
only the judge knew and disparity of counsel the remaining 6%. 16 From
these findings, they suggest that the combination of values and evidence
explained a significant number of judge–jury disagreements. To understand
the influence of these factors on jury decisions, they posited the “liberation
hypothesis” 17—that when the case was close on the evidence, the jury was
“liberated” from the dictates of the law and could, and did, give expression
to “sentiment” 18 in arriving at its verdict. 19
Kalven and Zeisel never stated explicitly that when judge and jury
disagreed about guilt, the judge was factually correct and the jury in error.
Rather, they employed metaphors that suggested this was the case. Thus,
14

See id. at 109 tbl.23.
Id. at 106.
16
Id. at 115 tbl.29.
17
By “close” in this context, they apparently meant that the judge identified both valuebased and evidence-based reasons to explain why the jury acquitted when the judge would
have convicted. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 166. Although they did ask expressly
about whether the case was “close” in their second survey (Question 12) involving 1,191
responses, they did not ask this question in the initial survey involving 2,385 trials. Id. at 49.
Perhaps for this reason, while they employ the “closeness” variable from the second survey
to provide a map of the evidence and to demonstrate that jury verdicts follow the evidence,
id. at 134, 158–59, they do not make substantial use of that variable in their development of
disagreement cases and the relative roles of values and evidence. Id. at 163–64. In a
footnote, id. at 164 n.2, they present an apparently mislabeled table (they title it “Normal
Disagreements” when the table only makes sense if it includes both “normal” and “crossover” disagreements) indicating the percentage of disagreements between judge and jury in
clear and close cases. They do so, the footnote indicates, to show that disagreement occurs
in clear cases as well as close cases. This is not a point they develop at any length in the
text.
18
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 165.
19
As summarized in The American Jury, “The sentiment gives direction to the resolution
of the evidentiary doubt; the evidentiary doubt provides a favorable condition for a response
to the sentiment. The closeness of the evidence makes it possible for the jury to respond to
sentiment by liberating it from the discipline of the evidence.” Id. at 165.
15
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the judge’s view of the case was a “baseline representing the law,” 20 while
the close cases in which the jury came to a different conclusion constituted
a “war with the law,” albeit a “modest and subtle” one. 21 They asserted,
“[W]hen the jury reaches a different decision from the judge on the same
evidence, it does so not because it is a sloppy or inaccurate finder of facts,
but because it gives expression to values which fall outside the official
rules.” 22 This conclusion reflected the popularly understood genius of the
jury system that tempers the rigors of the law with the common sense of the
community.
Until recently, attempts to replicate Kalven and Zeisel’s findings in
Most studies
criminal trial decisions have been quite limited. 23
investigating the factors that inform judge and jury verdicts have relied
upon comparisons of judge and jury verdicts in small samples of cases,
interviews with decisionmakers about previous cases and experimental
designs employing mock juries. These methodologies have a number of
strengths and limitations. Judge–jury verdict comparisons from actual
criminal trials necessarily involve the judge rendering a hypothetical
judgment while the jury renders a real one. It is possible that judges will be
less meticulous in evaluating the evidence when it is not their responsibility
to decide a case, and that what the jury has already done may influence the
verdict that judges indicate they would render. 24 However, reasoning from

20

Id. at 499.
Id. at 495.
22
Id. Kalven and Zeisel also suggested “most but not all of the time” when juries agreed
with judges, the jury was “not importing values of its own” into its decision about guilt or
innocence. Id. at 494. Further, when juries and judges disagreed about guilt, they suggested
“two-thirds of the disagreements with judges are marked by some jury response to values.”
Id. at 495.
23
Many of the studies comparing judge and jury decisions involve civil rather than
criminal cases. See Jennifer K. Robbenolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A
Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 477–78 (2005). While these studies
are informative, they do not truly represent the experience of judges and juries in the
criminal justice system. The burden of proof in a civil case is “more probable than not.” In
the civil setting, justice is achieved when the parties are afforded a fair process for making
their case before a disinterested adjudicator. Criminal justice seeks a higher end: that the
court would ideally convict only those who actually committed the crime in question.
Additionally, the law in many civil cases invites the decisionmaker to consult values in
determining whether the defendant behaved appropriately (for example, was the defendant’s
behavior unreasonable, was the product unreasonably dangerous?). The very studies that
demonstrate that juries are more lenient than judges in criminal cases also indicate that there
is no particular direction to leniency in civil cases—when they disagree, it is as likely that
the judge is more lenient than the jury as the other way around. See Larry Heuer & Steven
Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 29 (1994).
24
See Robbenolt, supra note 23, at 473–77.
21
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other empirical approaches presents even greater challenges. Archival
studies such as post-judgment interviews with judges and juries about their
decisionmaking processes often do not collect data from judges and juries
in the same cases. 25 Simulations and mock jury experiments also pose
challenges since, no matter how realistic the presentation, the participants
are aware that their decisions have no genuine consequences.26 Despite
these challenges, research since The American Jury has advanced our
understanding of the effect of evidentiary and extra-evidentiary factors on
jury verdicts.
A. THE ROLE OF EXTRA-EVIDENTIARY FACTORS ON JURY VERDICTS

Extra-evidentiary factors affect jury verdicts, but the contexts in which
such factors exert influence are limited. Research conducted in the 1980s
using data from thirty-eight sexual assault cases found that juror decisions
are dominated by evidentiary factors as opposed to victim or defendant
characteristics and that juror attitudes have little explanatory power with
respect to case outcomes. 27 Further analysis of the same set of sexual
assault cases suggests that when liberation based on juror sentiment did
occur, it was only in those cases that were closest on the evidence.28 Other
research has found that “case related” extra-evidentiary influences such as
charge severity, pretrial publicity and trial complexity affect jury verdicts,
but only when the evidence presented by the prosecution is ambiguous or
Measures of defendant characteristics such as race and
weak. 29
attractiveness (traditionally categorized as indicators of jury sentiment) did
not measurably affect jury verdicts under any evidentiary conditions.30

25
Neil Vidmar, Making Inferences About Jury Behavior from Jury Verdict Statistics:
Cautions About the Lorelei’s Lied, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 599, 607–08 (1994).
26
Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of
Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 443, 445 (2005); Shari
Seidman Diamond, Illumination and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 561, 564 (1997).
27
Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1987).
28
Barbara F. Reskin & Christy A. Visher, The Impacts of Evidence and Extralegal
Factors in Jurors’ Decisions, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 423, 425–26 (1986). Reskin and
Visher measured juror sentiment by (1) assessment of the defendant’s attractiveness, (2) any
reference to the defendant being employed or unemployed, (3) any negative comment about
the victim’s moral character, and (4) juror perception of the victim’s responsibility for the
assault. They classified hard evidence as eyewitness testimony, physical evidence,
recovered weapon, and physical injury to the victim. Id.
29
Dennis J. Devine et al., Strength of Evidence, Extraevidentiary Influence, and the
Liberation Hypothesis: Data from the Field, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 136, 142–43 (2009).
30
Id. at 136, 144–45.
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Recent reanalysis of the data originally collected by Kalven and Zeisel
using more sophisticated multivariate regression analysis techniques called
into question a central premise of Kalven and Zeisel’s hypothesis—the
notion that evidentiary strength and juror sentiment were independent
phenomena. Reanalyzing Kalven and Zeisel’s data, Gastwirth and Sinclair
found a strong relationship between a defendant’s lack of a criminal record
and the perception of judges that jurors were sympathetic to the defendant.
They further found that judges’ perceptions that jurors were sympathetic to
defendants (actually brought about in part by the lack of criminal record)
diminished after controlling for the severity of the cases.31 These findings
suggest that the liberation hypothesis may not actually work as Kalven and
Zeisel posited. Instead, the presence or absence of particular evidentiary
factors may actually bring about juror sympathy for the defendant,
necessitating methodologies that control for these factors independently.
Because jurors are more likely than judges are to have demographic
characteristics that may lead to identification with—and leniency toward—
defendants, extralegal factors such as defendant or juror race might be
expected to influence jury decisions. 32 Numerous studies suggest a
relationship between juror characteristics and jury leniency toward samerace defendants, 33 but this relationship appears strongest when the evidence
supporting guilt is mixed or weak. 34 Other jury research, however, suggests
a more complex relationship between juror race, interpretation of evidence

31

Joseph L. Gastwirth & Michael D. Sinclair, A Re-examination of the 1966 KalvenZeisel Study of Judge–Jury Agreements and Disagreements and Their Causes, 3 LAW,
PROBABILITY & RISK 169 (2004).
32
Data from the Capital Jury Project, a national study of capital jurors’ decisionmaking
using interviews with more than 1,000 actual jurors from trials in fourteen states, indicates
there are significant differences between black and white jurors in terms of their degree of
doubt about guilt, perceptions of defendant remorse, and beliefs about the future
dangerousness of the defendant. See William Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and
White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 J.
CONST. L. 171, 190–91 (2001); see also DONALD BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE (1993);
Norbert L. Kerr et al., Defendant Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments, 19 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 545 (1989).
33
Sheri L. Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1620
(1985); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 597 (2006); Denis Chimaeze E. Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in
Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 133, 136–43
(1979).
34
VALERIE P HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1991); Robert J. MacCoun &
Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury Deliberation: Jurors’ Bias for
Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 21 (1988).
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and liberation, 35 sometimes finding no measurable relationship between
defendant and juror race and case outcomes. 36
Those attempting to apply the liberation hypothesis to other criminal
justice decisions, particularly sentencing, have achieved mixed results.37
Consideration of extralegal factors appears to be constrained when judges
sentence offenders convicted of more serious crimes such as murder, rape
and robbery, but these same judges appear “liberated” to consider extralegal
factors such as race in sentencing decisions in less serious cases. 38 There is
only mixed support for the liberation hypothesis in the disposition of
murder cases at various stages of the criminal justice process. While victim
characteristics affect the processing or murder cases, the effects are not
clearly limited to a particular level of case severity. 39
Principles from the liberation hypothesis have also been used in
support of the argument that defendant and victim race significantly affects
capital sentencing under conditions of less-than-clear defendant culpability
and ambiguous evidence. 40 In an important study cited in McCleskey v.
Kemp, 41 Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski found the race of the victim
predicted capital sentences only in those cases where the evidence
supporting conviction was neither particularly strong nor particularly
weak. 42 Other studies, however, find that the effects of defendant and

35
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making,
51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986).
36
See Devine et al., supra note 30, at 145 (finding that defendant and foreperson race
does not predict acquittal under any type of evidentiary condition).
37
Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race, Homicide Severity, and Application of the
Death Penalty: A Consideration of the Barnett Scale, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 511 (1989) (finding
no support for the liberation hypothesis in their study of prosecutors’ decisions to request the
death penalty in Kentucky and suggesting that considerations of defendant and victim race
were not confined to legally ambiguous cases); cf. Eric Baumer et al., The Role of Victim
Characteristics in the Disposition of Murder Cases, 17 JUST. Q. 281 (2000) (finding only
mixed support for the liberation hypothesis in the disposition of murder cases at various
stages of the criminal justice process and concluding that while victim characteristics affect
the processing or murder cases, the effects are not clearly limited to a particular level of case
severity).
38
Cassia Spohn & Jerry Cederblom, Race and Disparities in Sentencing: A Test of the
Liberation Hypothesis, 8 JUST. Q. 305, 322 (1991).
39
Baumer et al., supra note 37, at 281.
40
Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1327 (1985).
41
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
42
David Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of
the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983).
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victim race on decisions to seek the death penalty are not confined to
legally ambiguous cases. 43
B. PREDICTING JURY AND JUDGE DISAGREEMENT

Despite attempts to apply principles of the liberation hypothesis to
understand legal outcomes in the criminal justice system, there has been
relatively little direct examination of the decisionmaking of judges
compared to juries. There are many reasons to anticipate juries would
decide cases differently than judges. Juries are “one-shot” versus repeat
players. 44 They are unlikely to be aware of the norms and expectations of
court actors who have regular interactions and do not have the constraints
that accompany repeated interactions. They decide collectively rather than
individually, are not legally trained, and are more likely than the judiciary
to be ethnically diverse. On the other hand, being novices and under the
direction of the judge, they may also respond in their verdict to both verbal
and nonverbal cues provided by the judge. 45
Despite these differences, judges and juries are often in agreement
about the outcome of legal cases.46 When juries do disagree with judges,
the research has demonstrated consistently, it is in the direction of greater
leniency towards the defendant. The NCSC’s four-jurisdiction study of
criminal trials found that the rates at which judges and juries agreed today
resemble those reported by Kalven and Zeisel fifty years ago. 47 Judges and
juries in the NCSC data agreed on conviction in 64% of the cases
(compared to 62% agreement on conviction found by Kalven and Zeisel)
and agreed on acquittal in 14% of the cases (compared to 13% found by
Kalven and Zeisel). The jury acquitted when the judge would have
convicted in 19% of the cases (the same proportion identified by Kalven
and Zeisel) and the jury convicted when the judge would have acquitted in
43

Keil & Vito, supra note 37.
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974).
45
Peter D. Blanck, What Empirical Research Tells Us: Studying Judges’ and Juries’
Behavior, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 775 (1991); Ann Burnett & Diane Badzinski, Judge
Nonverbal Communication on Trial: Do Mock Trial Jurors Notice?, 55 J. COMM. 209
(2005).
46
Robbennolt observed,
44

The most notable conclusion to be drawn from this emerging literature is that the decisionmaking
of judges and jurors is strikingly similar. While there is evidence of some differences, there is a
high degree of agreement between the groups, they appear to decide real cases quite similarly,
and they show a great deal of similarity in responding to simulated cases designed to examine a
variety of legal decisionmaking processes.

See Robbenolt, supra note 23, at 502.
47
Eisenberg et al., supra note 11, at 180–83.
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only 3% of the cases (compared to 6% identified by Kalven and Zeisel).48
They also found that holding the strength of the case constant, juries were
more likely to acquit than judges. 49 This was true whether one employs the
judge or the jury’s assessment of the strength of the evidence. This finding
confirmed Kalven and Zeisel’s best-known observation—that judges appear
to have a lower conviction threshold than juries—but leaves open the
question of why this is so. Are jurors prone to acquittal in the sense that
they either are moved by sentiment or are unduly credulous while the judge
responds objectively to fact? Alternatively, are judges prone to conviction
in the sense that they cannot accurately identify the innocent in any but the
most obvious case? 50 Research using the NCSC data indicates that jurors
are more attuned than judges to features of the defense case. Whether the
defendant produced a witness to support his version of events, whether or
not the defendant had a criminal record, and whether he refused to plead
guilty on the ground that he is innocent affect juror willingness to acquit,
but have little impact on the judge’s evaluation of the case.51
The NCSC investigation expanded significantly upon the kinds of
information collected and analyzed in The American Jury. The NCSC
survey secured information from individual jurors about the factors that
informed their decision—particularly their assessments of the evidence and
their sentiments about the law and the defendant. These questions, coupled
with those dealing with the nature of the evidence and the strength of the
case, provide a basis for attempting to determine whether Kalven and
Zeisel’s explanation for judge–jury disagreement finds support among
today’s jurors. More significantly, the NCSC data permits an examination
of the factors that lead judges and juries to agree about guilt and innocence
as well as those that lead to disagreement. The data cannot tell us whether
any of these decisions are factually correct but it can provide a basis for
determining whether the factors that are associated with these outcomes are
logically related to decisions about guilt or innocence.

48

Id. at 181.
Id.; Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse
from the National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1249
(2003).
50
The NCSC data has also been used in other scholarship to measure the probability that
that jury decisionmaking may be prone to either type I (jury incorrectly convicts the
innocent) and type II error (jury acquits the guilty). See, e.g., Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating
the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 305 (2007).
51
Daniel Givelber & Amy Farrell, Judges and Juries: The Defense Case and Differences
in Acquittal Rates, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 31, 39–44 (2008).
49
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C. THE CURRENT STUDY: UNDERSTANDING JUDGE AND JURY
DISAGREEMENT

The current study examines the influence of a range of factors,
including measures of evidence and jury sentiment, on judge and jury
agreement or disagreement about a defendant’s guilt. We measure the
effect of these factors under conditions in which decisionmakers (examined
separately for judges and juries) indicate the case is close on the evidence
compared to cases that are not deemed close. In so doing, we are able to
test directly in actual criminal trials the “liberation hypothesis” that, in close
cases, sentiment moves juries but not judges to find defendants not guilty.
Our analysis does not test what Kalven and Zeisel actually found—that
judges explain jury disagreements by suggesting that juries are moved by
values rather than facts. (We do not test this contention directly because the
judge was not asked to explain why she disagreed with the jury verdict;
rather, the judge and jurors responded independently to different
questionnaires concerning the importance of various evidentiary and nonevidentiary factors in the case that the jurors had just decided.) The
liberation hypothesis, however, stands for a proposition grander than how
judges explain disagreements. 52 It holds that in close cases juries are more
lenient than judges because jurors render decisions based on their feelings
about the law and the defendant. In this analysis, we test two hypotheses
central to the premises of the liberation hypothesis: first, that jury sentiment
distinguishes cases where judges and juries disagree about guilt; and
second, that sentiment has the strongest effect on judge and jury
disagreement in cases that are close on the evidence. This inquiry is
important because the claim that juries are moved by personal sentiment to
acquit those whom the judge views as guilty fuels the perception that a “not
guilty” verdict is less of an assessment of whether the defendant is actually
innocent than it is a response to legally irrelevant factors. This presumption
contributes to the view that “they are all guilty of something,” even if the
state cannot prove it in court.

52
Interestingly, the NCSC data analyzed in the present study suggests judges may not be
adroit at predicting how the jury will decide a case, casting some doubt on the ability of
judges to understand why juries may disagree with the verdicts they would have rendered.
Asking judges to predict how the jury would decide the case and comparing those responses
to the verdict the jury actually rendered (excluding hung juries), the NCSC data indicates
that judges accurately predicted the jury’s decision 81% of the time (214 out of 264 cases).
Judges were more proficient at predicting convictions than acquittals. The jury behaved as
the judge predicted 86% of the time (161 out of 187 cases) when the judge thought the jury
would convict but only 69% of the time (53 out of 77 cases) when the judge predicted the
jury would acquit.
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data used to answer these questions was originally collected and
analyzed by the National Center for State Courts as part of a study on hung
juries. 53 For the hung jury study, the NCSC collected information from trial
courts in the Central Criminal Division of the Los Angeles County Superior
Court, California; the Maricopa County Superior Court (Phoenix), Arizona;
the Bronx County Supreme Court, New York; and the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia between 2000 and 2001. 54 Data was collected on noncapital felony trials in each jurisdiction. The data from this study includes
case information about the nature of the charges, demographic information
on the offender and victim(s), voir dire, trial evidence and procedures, and
jury deliberations for 289 separate criminal cases.55 In addition to case
information, questionnaires were submitted to the presiding judge and to the
prosecution and defense attorneys to elicit information about their
perceptions of the case proceedings and outcomes. Individual jurors in each
case also completed questionnaires about their perceptions of the evidence
and testimony presented at trial, the deliberation process, and the outcome
of the case. 56 These additional sources of data provide a unique opportunity
to examine the sources of judge–jury disagreement, and may even provide
some indication of whether the judge or the jury provides the more reliable
judgment as to whether the accused is guilty. The data utilized here also
overcomes many limitations of previous research, particularly expanding

53

PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL
SOC. RESEARCH, EVALUATION OF HUNG JURIES IN BRONX COUNTY, NEW YORK, LOS
ANGELES COUNTY CALIFORNIA, MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA, AND WASHINGTON D.C.,
2000–2001 (2002), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3689.
54
According to the authors of the original study, sites were chosen based on a
convenience sample. Some attention was given to sites with particular concerns about hung
juries. For a detailed description of the sampling and study design, see id.
55
The dataset originally included 394 cases. Thirty-two cases with no case disposition
information, twenty-nine cases with no indication of how the judge would have decided the
case, and twenty cases with missing data relevant to measures in our present inquiry were
excluded from the analysis. An additional twenty-eight cases where the jury hung on all
charges were also removed for the present analysis. Consistent with the approach of Kalven
and Zeisel, our analysis focuses on the cases in which the jury either acquits the defendant of
all charges or convicts him of at least one charge. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 60.
56
Individual questionnaires were completed by jurors serving in each case. A total of
3,497 juror surveys were completed for the 394 cases (80% response rate). Since the present
analysis is conducted at the case level, individual juror responses were averaged for all jurors
in each case to create aggregate jury responses.
AND
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the analysis to multiple case types across four courts throughout the
country. 57
To test the effect of juror sentiment in those cases where judges and
juries disagree on the outcome of the case, we construct a series of
multinomial regression models to compare the effects of legal and
extralegal variables on judge and jury agreement and disagreement. We
measure agreement and disagreement as (1) agreement on guilt; (2)
agreement on acquittal; (3) disagreement on acquittal, where a judge would
convict but the jury acquits; and (4) disagreement on guilt, where a judge
would acquit but the jury convicts. We utilize multinomial logistic
regression, an extension for binary logistic regression because our outcome
is categorical and has more than two levels. Multinomial regression
provides a set of coefficients for each of the comparison groups. The
coefficients for the reference group are zeros, similar to the reference group
for a dummy coded variable. Through this analysis, we seek to understand
if differences between judge and jury outcomes are explained by the notion
that judges are guided by “facts” and juries by “sentiments” or whether
judges and juries respond to evidence in distinctive ways. 58 To specifically
test the liberation hypothesis that when the evidence is close, jury sentiment
predicts juror acquittal when judges would convict, we partition our data
and present multinomial models predicting judge and jury agreement in
cases (a) that judges indicate are close on the evidence compared to cases
that judges believe are not close; and (b) that juries indicate are close on the
evidence compared to those cases that juries believe are not close.
A. MEASURES

1. Outcome Measures
In the present analysis, we measure the effect of jury sentiment on four
possible case outcomes: (a) judge and jury agree on conviction, (b) judge
and jury agree on acquittal, (c) judge would convict, but the jury acquits,
and (d) judge would acquit, but jury convicts. We created the outcome
variable by combining information on the actual verdict rendered by the
juries in each of the 289 cases analyzed here with information provided by
57
Despite this advantage, the four courts analyzed here are all in urban areas limiting our
ability to draw conclusions concerning judge and jury disagreements in suburban or rural
areas.
58
The original NCSC data collected case-level information from court records, judges,
attorneys, and individual level juror information from each juror participating in a case.
Since multiple juror responses are nested in the case-level data in the original NCSC data,
we aggregated all juror responses to represent the average juror response for each case to
facilitate the use of multinomial regression modeling at the case level.
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judges about the verdict they would render if the case had been decided in a
bench trial. We then recoded case outcomes into separate dummy variables
where one equals the specified judge–jury agreement outcome and zero
equals another outcome. Since multinomial regression models predict a set
of coefficients for each of the outcome groups compared to a reference
category, we use judge and jury agreement on conviction as the reference
category against which to test the predictors of when a judge and jury agree
on acquittal, when a jury acquits when the judge would convict, and when a
jury convicts when judge would acquit.
Consistent with the approach of Kalven and Zeisel, 59 our analysis
focuses on the cases in which the jury either acquits the defendant of all
charges or convicts him of at least one charge. If jurors are driven by
sentiment when they disagree with the judge about guilt in close cases, one
would expect to find confirmation of this explanation in those cases in
which the disagreement is starkest—when judge and jury come to opposite
conclusions as to whether the defendant engaged in any criminal behavior.
It is possible that those who are convicted of some but not all charges may
be benefitting from jury sentiment, but the data provides no way to
characterize which mixed verdicts should be treated as counterfactual
“wins” for the defense and which should not. We eschew attempting to
characterize some mixed verdicts as “defendant wins” and others as
“prosecution wins” and instead treat all cases in which the defendant is
convicted of any count as a conviction. For the same reason, we have
omitted cases in which the jury hangs on all counts.
2. Independent Measures
Kalven and Zeisel attributed nearly 60% of the disagreements in which
the jury was more lenient than the judge to evidentiary factors and 40% to
jury sentiment about the law and the defendant. 60 To account for these
59

Kalven and Zeisel treated disagreements between judge and jury with respect to guilt
on various charges or penalty as “agreements to convict.” KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4,
at 60. Thus, their famous Table 11 setting forth the basic pattern of judge–jury agreement
treats every case in which the jury convicted on any count as representing a case in which
the jury agreed with the judge that the defendant should be convicted. Id. at 56 tbl.11.
60
Id. at 115 tbl.29. “Sentiments about the defendant” includes all reasons for
disagreement “attributable to the personal characteristics of the defendant.” “Sentiments
about the law” refers to “particular instances of ‘jury equity,’ reasons for disagreement that
imply criticism of either the law or legal result.” Id. at 107. Noting that it is “surprisingly
difficult to give a thumbnail sketch of evidence as a category of judge–jury disagreement,”
the authors indicate that “closeness of the case,” “differing requirements for proof,” and
“different interpretations of evidence” are all examples of the kinds of reasons assigned to
that category. Id. at 106. Disparity of counsel and facts known only to the judge accounted
for 4% and 2% of disagreements respectively. Id. at 115 tbl.29.
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important and distinct factors, we created a series of variables that measure
aspects of both phenomena. 61
3. Evidentiary Factors
“Quantity of the evidence” variables provide objective measures of the
evidence admitted in trial by either the prosecution or defense. The original
NCSC data includes separate counts of the number of witnesses and number
of exhibits presented by the prosecution and defense. To measure the
magnitude of the evidence presented by either the prosecution or defense,
we combined measures of witnesses and exhibits to create additive
measures of the total number of prosecution exhibits and witnesses and the
total number of defense prosecution exhibits and witnesses.
We also include factors that relate directly to the defendant’s case.
Recent research suggests that the quality of the defense case may be more
important than the quantity of witnesses or exhibits presented. When the
defense puts forward no witnesses or the defendant testifies alone, the jury
is much more likely to convict than when a defense witness or witnesses
testify particularly if the defendant also testifies. 62 To account for this
variation we include a dummy variable for the quality of the defense case.
A weak case is coded 0 and measured as no witnesses testifying (33%) or
only the defendant testifying alone (18%). A strong defense case is coded 1
and measured as a defense witness testifying either alone (24%) or in
combination with the defendant (28%).
The defendant’s criminal history is another important component of
the quality of the defense case. Defendants without criminal records are
less likely to be convicted than those with criminal records, even when the
jury does not learn of the criminal history during the course of the trial. 63
Information on the defendant’s criminal history is captured in the original
NCSC data in a variable indicating whether the jury learned about a
defendant’s criminal history (measured as yes, the jury learned about the
record, no, the jury did not learn about the record, or no criminal history
61

In Kalven and Zeisel’s study, sentiments about the defendant included reasons for
disagreement that were attributable to the personal characteristics of the defendant while
sentiments about the law referred to “particular instances of ‘jury equity,’ reasons for
disagreement that imply criticism of either the law or the legal result.” Id. at 107.
62
The defense offered testimony (either that of the defendant or a witness) in 85% of the
cases in which the defendant had no criminal record; the defendant himself testified in 68%
of all such cases. Since a defendant is entitled to put his character in issue, the jury would
have learned of the lack of a criminal record in all cases in which the defendant testified and
would have likely learned of it in the remaining cases in which a witness other than the
defendant testified. Givelber & Farrell, supra note 51, at 38 tbl.1.
63
Ronald A. Farrell & Victoria Lynn Swigert, Prior Offense Record as a Self-Fulfilling
Prophecy, 12 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 437, (1978).
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record). We recoded this variable into a dummy variable measuring
whether a defendant had a criminal history coded as 0 (regardless of
whether the jury learned about the record or not) and 1 when the defendant
did not have a criminal record.
The defendant’s claim of innocence also predicts disagreements
between the judge and jury. 64 While the defendant’s insistence upon
innocence as a reason for not accepting a plea has no direct analogue in the
Kalven and Zeisel typology, it has been included in the present analysis as
indicative of the defense case. 65 The NCSC survey asked lawyers to
explain why the case had not ended in a plea bargain. This open-ended
question was coded into common response categories, including: (1)
because the defendant claimed he was innocent, (2) because the defendant
refused to plead, (3) because no offer was made, and (4) because the parties
could not agree on an appropriate plea. This is information that may or may
not come to the attention of the judge if she inquires about the defendant’s
willingness to plead but would not be presented to the jury as relevant to the
question of whether the defendant committed the crime. The reason for the
failure of the plea was recoded in the present analysis as a dummy variable
coded as 0 when the failure of a plea was any other reason besides the
defendant’s claim of innocence and 1 when the defendant claimed he was
innocent.
4. Jury Sentiment
Kalven and Zeisel explained 40% of the disagreement when juries
were more lenient than judges in terms of the jury’s beliefs about the
defendant and about the law. The NCSC study attempted to explore the
latter issue by asking jurors, “How fair do you believe the law was in this
case?” and “How fair would you say the legally correct outcome was?”
These questions were all measured on seven-point scales, recoded to
indicate scores of 1 represented the lowest assessment (i.e. least unfair) and
7 represented the highest assessment (i.e. most unfair). 66 The survey asked
64

Id. at 438.
Information on the reason a plea was rejected was missing for 56 of the 289 cases
analyzed here. To provide the most conservative measure of the effect of defendants
asserting their innocence in refusing the plea, we have recoded the missing values as 0
indicating the defendant did not assert innocence in the decision to reject a plea. It is
possible in some of these cases no plea was offered.
66
Questions about the fairness of the law and the legal outcome were originally coded in
the opposite direction where 1 indicated the most unfair and 7 indicated the least unfair. To
provide consistency across the sentiment measures, we reverse-coded the fairness measures
so the highest scores indicate the feeling that the law was the most unfair in order to parallel
the coding of feelings that the defendant was treated too harshly or that the jury felt
sympathy for the defendant.
65
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jurors another set of questions designed to measure sentiment toward the
defendant. These included: “To what extent were you worried about the
consequences to the defendant of a conviction by this jury?” and “How
much sympathy did you feel for the defendant?” Questions about juror
sentiment toward the defendant were also measured on a seven-point scale
where scores of 1 indicated the lowest assessment (i.e. least sympathy, least
worried about consequences) and scores of 7 indicated the highest
assessment (i.e. most sympathy, most worried about consequences). To
assess the effect of individual juror sentiment on case outcomes, we
aggregated the data from individual juror questionnaires in each case to
represent an average jury response for each case. A score measuring
sentiment toward the law was created by taking the mean of the available
score for questions about the fairness of the law and fairness of the legal
outcome (alpha=.75). A separate score measuring sentiment toward the
defendant was created by taking the mean of scores for questions about
juror sympathy toward the defendant and concern about the consequences
of conviction (alpha=.72).
5. Race of Defendant and Jurors
Though objective indicators of defendant characteristics do not, by
themselves, necessarily result in particular jury sentiments, Kalven and
Zeisel included judicial references to the characteristics of the defendants
within the category of jury sentiment in their typology of reasons for judge–
jury disagreement. Primary among these characteristics were the race,
gender, and age of the defendant. 67 Information on the race and gender of
the defendant was found in the NCSC case record data. Defendants were
classified originally as white non-Hispanic (10%), white Hispanic (25%),
black non-Hispanic (55%), black Hispanic (3%), Asian (1%), or another
race (5%). We created dummy variables measuring whether a defendant
was black (coded 0 for white non-Hispanic, black Hispanic, white Hispanic,
Asian, and other racial groups and 1 for black non-Hispanic), which is
included in the analysis to control for the effect of the defendants’ race.
Information was collected on defendant gender, but only 8% of all
defendants were female. As a result, given the relatively small number of
cases that included female offenders (28 out of 289), there was too little

67

Defendant race was categorized by Kalven and Zeisel as “White” or “Negro.” In cases
where judges thought disagreement with the jury was based on jury sentiment toward the
defendants, the judge indicated sympathy was felt toward white defendants, female
defendants and the youngest and oldest defendants. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 211
tbl.65.

2010] WHY JUDGES AND JURIES DISAGREE ABOUT GUILT

1567

variation in defendant gender to include in subsequent analyses. The NCSC
survey did not collect information concerning the defendant’s age.
In addition to measuring the effect of a defendant’s race on judge–jury
agreement, aggregate measures of the race of the jury were included in the
analysis. The racial composition of the jury is measured here as the
proportion of each jury that identify as being black.
6. Closeness of Case
The NCSC questionnaires to both judge and jury asked the question,
“All things considered, how close was the case?” on a seven-point scale
ranging from “evidence strongly favors prosecution” to “evidence strongly
favors defense.” Responses at the beginning of the range (1–2) indicate the
evidence favored the prosecution and responses at the end of the range (6–
7) indicate the evidence favored the defense. Responses in the middle of
the seven-point range (3–5) indicate the case was close—it neither favored
the prosecution or the defense. To provide a simplified measure of the
closeness of the case we created a dummy variable in which responses 1–2
or 6–7 were coded as 0 (indicating the evidence in the case favored either
the prosecution or the defense) and responses 3–5 were coded as 1
indicating the case was close. 68
7. Severity of Charge
The NCSC data provides information on the type of offense charged
for each count in each case. Sixteen offense types were included in this
data. To control for the effect of different types of charges, we created an
eight-point classification scale corresponding to the most serious offense
charged where 1= murder, manslaughter, and attempted murder, 2= rape
and robbery, 3= aggravated assault, weapons offense, and child abuse, 4=
burglary, 5= drug distribution or sales, 6= drug possession, 7= larceny and
theft, and 8= other less severe crimes. Drug offenses were the most
common offense, representing the most serious charge in 27% of the cases.
8. Location
Data was collected on criminal cases in four separate courts, the
Central Criminal Division of the Los Angeles County Superior Court,
California; the Maricopa County Superior Court (Phoenix), Arizona; the
68

Objective measures of the quantity of the evidence and judge or jury perceptions of
case closeness do not appear to measure the same phenomena. The correlation between the
objective measures of the quantity of the evidence (the number of witnesses and number of
exhibits presented) and judge or jury perceptions of closeness of the case is weak and nonsignificant.
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Bronx County Supreme Court, New York; and the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia. To control for the differences that may exist between
the courts, we created dummy variables indicating whether the case
originated or not in each of the four courts.
IV. FINDINGS
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for outcome and independent
measures for the 289 cases analyzed here. Sixty-four percent (185 out of
289) of the cases resulted in agreement between the judge and the jury on
conviction, 13% (37 out of 289) resulted in the judge and jury agreeing on
acquittal, 17% (49 out of 289) resulted in the jury acquitting when the judge
would have convicted and 6% (18 out of 289) resulted in the jury
convicting when the judge would have acquitted. As Eisenberg et al.
reported, the direction of judge–jury disagreement has remained unchanged
since Kalven and Zeisel 69—juries acquit when judges would have convicted
more often than they convict when judges would have acquitted. In more
than forty years, there has been practically no difference between the rate of
judge–jury agreement as to who is guilty (the jury agrees with the judge
when she would have convicted 79% of the time in both the NCSC data and
Kalven and Zeisel’s study). Today, however, there is a more substantial
difference in the rate at which they agree about acquittals. Juries in the
NCSC study agree with the judge when she would have acquitted only 67%
of the time compared to 86% of the time in the Kalven and Zeisel study.70
69

Eisenberg et al., supra note 11.
Kalven and Zeisel presented their findings concerning judge–jury agreement in two
important tables, Tables 11 and 12, which differed only in terms of their treatment of hung
juries. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 56 tbl.11, 58 tbl.12. Kalven and Zeisel’s Table 11
showed the extent of judge–jury agreement in cases in which the jury convicted, acquitted,
or hung. Id. at 56 tbl.11. Their Table 12 collapsed the jury verdict categories from three to
two by treating cases in which the jury hung as though half of them ended in convictions and
half of them were acquittals. Id. at 58 tbl.12. While a table presenting judge–jury agreement
with respect to convictions and acquittals only is easier to follow than one including hung
juries, Kalven and Zeisel never presented a serious rationale for dividing the hung juries
between guilty verdicts and acquittals as opposed to simply omitting them. Kalven and
Zeisel made this decision on the advice of an experienced prosecutor who estimated that
about half of the time trials that ended in a hung jury eventually resulted in a conviction
while the other half were either never retried or resulted in acquittal. See id. at 57–58. n.4.
We were unable to find any data concerning what happened to those defendants whose
trial ends in a hung jury for the NCSC study sites. Research suggests retrials result mostly in
convictions. See, e.g., PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? 26–27 (2002), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/
Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesProblemPub.pdf (finding that in nine counties nearly
70% of the small number of hung cases that were re-tried resulted in conviction). We chose
to omit hung juries for the presentation of our findings since the focus of our inquiry is to
understand what happens in cases in which judges and juries disagree about guilt and there is
70
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In contrast to the judge–jury agreement reported by Kalven and Zeisel,
contemporary jurors are more likely to agree with a judge’s decision to
convict than they are to agree with a judge’s decision to acquit.
The 289 cases examined here are evenly distributed across the four
court sites with 21% in Los Angeles, 26% in Maricopa County, 26% in the
Bronx, and 27% in Washington D.C. Fifty-five percent of the defendants
are black and on average 26% of the jury is black. In half of the cases, the
defense presents a witness testifying either alone or in combination with the
defendant. Overall, however, the prosecution presents more witnesses and
exhibits than the defense. On average, the prosecution presents 22.36
witnesses and exhibits compared to 6.27 on average for the defense. In

no reason to assume that half of the trials that end in hung juries are “actually” acquittals.
The table below presents the findings from Kalven and Zeisel’s Table 12 as it would look if
recalculated to exclude hung juries as well as the comparable data from the NCSC survey.
The italicized percentages illustrate the degree that the jury agrees with the judge’s
assessment of guilt or innocence.
Comparison of Judge–Jury Outcomes in NCSC Data to Kalven and Zeisel’s Data (Excluding
Hung Juries)
Kalven and Zeisel
Data

Jury Acquits

Jury Convicts

Total

% (N)

% (N)

% (N)

Judge Acquits

14.2% (479)
85.8%

2.3% (79)
14.2%

16.5% (558)
100%

Judge Convicts

17.9% (602)
21.4%

65.6% (2,217)
78.6%

83.5% (282)
100%

Total

32.0% (1,081)

68% (2,296)

100% (3,379)

NCSC Data

Jury Acquits

Jury Convicts

Total

% (N)

% (N)

% (N)

Judge Acquits

12.8% (37)
67.2%

6.2% (18)
32.7%

19.0% (55)
100%

Judge Convicts

16.9% (49)
20.9%

64.0% (185)
79.1%

81.0% (234)
100%

Total

29.8% (86)

70.2% (203)

100% (289)

As it turns out, our finding that the direction of judge–jury agreement has changed holds
true regardless of whether one excludes hung juries entirely (as we do here) or keeps hung
juries in the calculation or divides hung juries between convictions and acquittals as did
Kalven and Zeisel.
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Table 1
Descriptive Measures of Outcome and Independent Variables (n = 289)
Case outcome
Agree conviction

64.0% (185)

Judge convicts, jury acquits

17.0% (49)

Agree acquittal

12.8% (37)

Judge acquits, jury convicts

6.2% (18)

Site
Los Angeles

21.4% (62)

Maricopa

25.9% (75)

Bronx

26.2% (76)

D.C.

26.5% (76)

Defendant race
Non-black

45.0% (130)

Black

55.0% (159)

Quality of defense
No witnesses or defendant testifies alone

50.3% (145)

Witness testifies alone or with defendant

49.7% (144)

Criminal record
Defendant has a criminal record

79.2% (229)

Defendant does not have criminal record

20.8% (60)

Defendant claims innocence in plea refusal
No

61.6% ( 178)

Yes

38.4% (111)

Jury thinks case close
No

50.2% (145)

Yes

49.8% (144)

Judge thinks case close
No

45.9% (133)

Yes

53.1% (153)
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Table 1
(continued)
Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Percent jury black

25.69

25.53

0

100

Severity of charge

03.80

02.21

1

008

Number prosecution
witnesses & exhibits

20.36

24.42

1

235

Number defense
witnesses & exhibits

06.27

11.99

0

102

Jury sentiment
about law

02.39

00.77

1

007

Jury sentiment to
defendant

03.21

00.84

1

007

21% of the cases, the defendant does not have a criminal record and in 38%
of the cases, the defendant asserts his innocence as the reason that he will
not accept a plea bargain.
On a scale of 1 to 7 measuring jury sentiment toward the law (with 1
indicating the law is the most fair and 7 indicating the law is the least fair)
and jury sentiment toward the defendant (with 1 indicating the least
sympathy or concern for the defendant and 7 indicating the most sympathy
or concern for the defendant), juries on average rated the law and legally
correct outcome as a 2.39 and their sentiment toward the defendant as a
3.21. Judges are slightly more likely to indicate that a case is close on the
evidence than juries. In the 289 cases analyzed here, the jury indicates that
the case is close on the evidence 50% of the time while the judge believes
this to be true in 53% of the cases.
The distribution of measures varies across cases with different levels
of judge and jury agreement. We conducted chi-square tests for
independence and analyses of variance to examine differences in the
independent variables across the four case outcomes (statistically significant
differences are noted in Table 2). Case outcomes varied significantly across
courts. Judges and juries agreed on the case outcome (conviction or
acquittal) 89% of the time in Los Angeles and 87% of the time in Maricopa,
but only 65% of the time in the Bronx and D.C. respectively. Juries in the
Bronx were more than twice as likely to have acquitted when the judge
would have convicted compared to Los Angeles and four times more likely
to do so compared to juries in Maricopa County. Juries in Washington,
D.C. were the most likely to acquit when the judge would have convicted,
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Table 2
Bivariate Relationships Between Independent Variables and Case
Outcomes
Judge would convict

Judge would acquit

Jury
convicts
(n=185)

Jury
acquits
(n=49)

Jury
acquits
(n=37)

Jury
convicts
(n=18)

Los Angeles

78.5%

09.2%

10.8%

01.5%

Maricopa

69.6%

05.1%

17.7%

07.6%

Bronx

51.5%

22.7%

13.6%

12.1%

D.C.

55.8%

31.2%

09.1%

03.9%

60.9%

13.5%

17.3%

08.3%

66.7%

19.9%

09.0%

04.5%

No witnesses or
defendant testifies alone

75.5%

10.8%

07.2%

06.5%

Witness testifies alone
or with defendant

53.3%

22.7%

18.0%

06.0%

Defendant has criminal
record

69.8%

13.5%

12.1%

04.7%

Defendant does not have
criminal record

43.3%

30.0%

18.3%

08.3%

No

73.0%

14.0%

06.7%

06.2%

Yes

49.5%

21.6%

22.5%

06.3%

No

75.9%

09.5%

10.2%

04.4%

Yes

53.3%

23.3%

15.3%

08.0%

Site***

Race

**

Non-black
Black
Quality of defense

***

Prior criminal history***

Defendant claims
innocent***

Judge thinks case
close***

*

p <.10; ** p <.05; *** p <.01
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Table 2
(continued)
Judge would convict

Judge would acquit

Jury
convicts
(n=185)

Jury
acquits
(n=49)

Jury
acquits
(n=37)

Jury
convicts
(n=18)

No

87.8%

03.6%

04.3%

04.3%

Yes

36.9%

30.6%

22.4%

07.5%

Mean

Mean

Mean

Mean

23.72

36.35

22.29

21.92

Severity of charge

03.73

03.69

04.00

04.33

Number prosecution
witnesses & exhibits*

23.09

18.12

13.28

14.63

Number defense
witnesses & exhibits

06.52

05.36

06.97

04.94

Jury sentiment about
law***

02.22

02.80

02.56

02.74

Jury sentiment about
defendant***

03.32

02.98

02.90

03.51

Jury thinks case close***

**

Percent jury black

with disagreements three times the rate of those in Los Angeles and six
times that of Maricopa County. Disagreements in the direction of juror
liberation were also more common when the defendant was black (20% of
cases resulted in jury acquittal when judge would have convicted compared
to only 14% when the defendant was another race) and when a higher
proportion of the jury members are black. There were no significant
differences in case outcomes with various levels of charge severity.
The quantity of the evidence, measured by the numbers of witnesses
presented by the prosecution has a significant, but rather moderate, effect
on case outcomes. The average number of witnesses and exhibits presented
by the prosecution is higher in cases where the judge and jury agree on guilt
(an average of 23 prosecution witnesses and exhibits) than those cases
where the judge and jury agree on acquittal (an average of 13 prosecution
witnesses and exhibits) or the jury disagrees with the judge (an average of
18 prosecution witnesses and exhibits in liberation cases). The number of
witnesses and exhibits presented by the defense is not significantly related
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to the case outcome. The quality of the defense presented, however, does
affect whether or not the judge and jury agree. When the defense presents a
weak case (either no witnesses testify or only the defendant testifies as a
witness) the judge and jury agreement about guilt is quite robust (76%).
When the defense presents a stronger case (defense witnesses testify alone
or in combination with the defendant), agreement about conviction drops to
53%. Juries are twice as likely to acquit when the judge would have
convicted in cases where the defense presents a witness other than or in
addition to the defendant. Not surprisingly, the judge and jury are most the
likely to agree about acquittal in those cases where the defendant and a
supporting witness testify together.
The findings from the NCSC data reveal that the defendant’s lack of a
criminal history significantly predicts judge and jury disagreement about
conviction. Judges and juries were significantly more likely to agree about
the case outcome in those cases in which the defendant had a criminal
history (agreeing to convict 70% of the time). When the defendant did not
have a criminal history, agreement on conviction dropped to 43%, and 30%
of these cases resulted in jury acquittals when the judge would have
convicted. In fact, judges disagreed with the jury’s decision to acquit
defendants without a criminal history two-thirds of the time, suggesting that
the lack of a criminal history may have moved juries towards acquittal in
many cases in which judges believed the defendant to be guilty.
The NCSC data provides a unique opportunity to explore the
relationship between the defendant’s reason for refusing to plead guilty and
jury outcomes. Although juries were unlikely to know the reason the
defendant refused to plead, a defendant’s claim of innocence to his or her
attorney has a strong positive effect on jury acquittal. Juries acquitted in
44% of all cases in which the defendant did not plead because he insisted he
was innocent; judges agreed with the jury that the defendant was not guilty
in half of these cases. Perhaps defendants insist that they are innocent in
order to encourage their lawyer to behave vigorously on their behalf.
Perhaps they insist on their innocence although they know themselves to be
guilty because they believe that the state has a weak case. However, a
defendant sophisticated enough to claim innocence in order to manipulate
his lawyer may well be sophisticated enough to know the risks of insisting
upon trial should he be convicted. His lawyer will tell him that if he is
convicted after trial, the judge may increase his sentence beyond what he
would have received if he pled and may increase it even more if he takes
the stand and insists unsuccessfully upon his own innocence. 71 Defendants
71
Cf. Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility
and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (2000).
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may also decline a plea bargain on the grounds of innocence because they
are, in fact, innocent. At a minimum, juries—who are ignorant of plea
offers and their refusal—respond more positively to defendants who refuse
to plead on this ground.
Jury sentiments about the law and the defendant also differed
significantly by case outcomes. Not surprisingly, juries felt the law and
legally correct outcome were most fair in those cases where they agreed
with the judge on conviction (average rating of 2.22 on a scale of 1 to 7
where 1 is most fair and 7 is least fair). The jury felt the law as well as the
legally correct outcome was least fair in liberation cases, when they
acquitted and the judge would have convicted (average rating of 2.80).
Contrary to Kalven and Zeisel’s liberation hypothesis, we find the juries’
concern and sympathy for the defendant appears to be reserved for those
cases where the defendant is convicted. Juries had the least amount of
sympathy for the defendant or concern about the consequences of a
conviction (measured on a scale of 1 to 7 where a score of 1 represents the
least sympathy or concern and 7 represents the most sympathy or concern)
in those cases where they acquitted (either with or without the judge’s
agreement). It is possible that the jury does not worry about the
consequences to the defendant in cases in which they acquit because their
action benefits rather than harms the defendant.
The liberation hypothesis rests upon the notion that cases that are close
on the evidence free jurors to consider sentiment. Unlike Kalven and
Zeisel’s data, which only allowed for examination of the judge’s
perspective of the closeness of a case, the NCSC data provides information
from both the judge and the jury about the degree to which they believe the
case is close on the evidence. Not surprisingly, jury assessment of case
closeness is more predictive of acquittal than judicial assessment. When
the jury indicates that the case is close on the evidence, they acquit 53% of
the time compared to only 8% of the time when they do not think the case is
close on the evidence. When judges think the case is close, the jury acquits
in only 39% of the cases compared to 20% when the judge does not think
the case is close.
The NCSC data confirms that close cases breed judge and jury
disagreement. When judges think cases are close on the evidence, the jury
agrees with the judge on the case outcome in only 69% of the cases
(compared to 86% agreement when the judge thinks the evidence is clear).
Turning to jury assessments of closeness, we find the gap in agreement
about case outcomes to be even wider. When juries think the case is close
on the evidence, they agree with the judge 59% of the time: in 37% of the
cases they agree that the defendant is guilty while in 22% of the cases they
agree that the defendant is not guilty. Conversely, when juries do not think

Table 3

-.021***
(.845)**
-.423***
(.734)**
-.573***
(.519)**
-.012***
(.013)**
-.012***
(.122)**
-.044***
(.017)**
-.009***
(.029)**

-2.433***
(.927)**
-.911***
(.615)**
-.506***
(.532)**
.005***
(.011)**
.068***
(.128)**
-.032***
(.017)**
-.028***
(.040)**

Maricopa

Bronx

Defendant black

Jury black

Charge severity

Prosecution witnesses
& exhibits

Defense witnesses &
exhibits

-.811
(.815)**

-1.652
(768)**

LA

***

-.015***
(.038)**

-.027***
(.022)**

.211***
(.168)**

-.020***
(.017)**

-.541***
(.764)**

.462***
(.919)**

-.853***
(1.192)**

-2.330
(1.382)**

***

B/(SE)

-.030***
(.051)**

-.029***
(.017)**

.078***
(.131)**

.003***
(.011)**

-.458***
(.540)**

-.868***
(.615)**

-2.353***
(.926)**

-1.698
(.794)**

***

B/(SE)

B/(SE)

***

-.014***
(.029)**

-.041***
(.017)**

.007***
(.122)**

-.015***
(.013)**

-.531***
(.522)**

-.350***
(.735)**

.023***
(.849)**

-.652
(.816)**

***

B/(SE)

-.017***
(.038)**

-.026***
(.022)**

.209***
(.167)**

-.022***
(.017)**

-.568***
(.760)**

.468***
(.917)**

-.864***
(1.186)**

-2.247
(1.382)**

***

B/(SE)

Judge acquits,
jury convicts

B/(SE)

Judge acquits,
jury acquits

Judge convicts,
jury acquits

Judge acquits,
jury acquits

Judge convicts,
jury acquits

Judge acquits,
jury convicts

Model 2: Evidence, Sentiment, and
Judge Closeness

Model 1: Evidence and Sentiment

-.009***
(.048)**

-.028***
(.018)**

.079***
(.146)**

-.006***
(.012)**

-.425***
(.597)**

-.913***
(.696)**

-3.385***
(1.081)**

-2.672
(.927)**

***

B/(SE)

Judge convicts,
jury acquits

.001***
(.035)**

-.044***
(.018)**

-.031***
(.133)**

-.022***
(.014)**

-.657***
(.576)**

-.490***
(.795)**

-.546***
(.932)**

-1.624
(.932)**

***

B/(SE)

Judge acquits,
jury acquits

-.007***
(.035)**

-.024***
(.021)**

.206***
(.174)**

-.022***
(.017)**

-.540***
(.777)**

.404***
(.950)**

-.922***
(1.209)**

-2.544***
(1.426)**

B/(SE)

Judge acquits,
jury convicts

Model 3: Evidence, Sentiment, and
Jury Closeness

Multinomial Regression Predicting Judge and Jury Agreement (n=289)

*

p <.10;

**

p <.05;

***

-6.246***
(2.981)**

-

-

-.059***
(.370)**

1.095***
(.393)**

-.449***
(.700)**

.766***
(.754)**

1.325
(.735)**

***

B/(SE)

-2.905***
(1.253)**

.484

2.412***
(1.879)**

-

.708***
(.491)**

.711***
(.506)**
.-

-1.215***
(.343)**

.824***
(.314)**

1.303***
(.476)**

.499***
(.603)**

1.399
(.571)**

***

B/(SE)

-.949***
(.310)**

.920***
(.314)**

.084***
(.473)**

1.789***
(.642)**

.383
(.549)**

***

B/(SE)

p <.01; reference category is judge and jury agreement about conviction

.476

2.160***
(1.855)**

-3.523***
(1.921)**

Intercept

R-Square (Nagelkerke)

-

-

Jury case close

-1.254***
(.342)**

-.967***
(.307)**

Jury sentiment about
defendant
-

.827***
(.314)**

.928***
(.311)**

Jury sentiment about
law

-

1.344***
(.475)**

.167***
(.467)**

Defendant claims
innocent

Judge case close

.627***
(.591)**

1.996***
(.549)**

No criminal history

1.450
(.564)**

.539
(.532)**

Quality of defense case

***

B/(SE)

***

-6.003***
(3.004)**

-

.355***
(.646)**

-.058***
(.366)**

1.167***
(.428)**

-.444***
(.705)**

.685***
(.761)**

1.265
(.737)**

***

B/(SE)

Judge acquits,
jury convicts

B/(SE)

Judge acquits,
jury acquits

Judge convicts,
jury acquits

Judge acquits,
jury acquits

Judge convicts,
jury acquits

Judge acquits,
jury convicts

Model 2: Evidence, Sentiment, and
Judge Closeness

Model 1: Evidence and Sentiment

-1.292***
(2.121)**

3.364***
(.736)**

-

-1.028***
(.342)**

.332***
(.349)**

.026***
(.516)**

2.509***
(.663)**

-.372
(.610)**

***

B/(SE)

Judge convicts,
jury acquits

.593

3.302***
(.1.971)**

2.703***
(.663)**

-

-1.285***
(.382)**

.364***
(.347)**

1.188***
(.515)**

.646***
(.683)**

.842
(.612)**

***

B/(SE)

Judge acquits,
jury acquits

-5.475***
(3.061)**

1.176***
(.715)**

-

-.072***
(.372)**

.852***
(.401)**

-.503***
(.709)**

.743***
(.775)**

1.001***
(783)**

B/(SE)

Judge acquits,
jury convicts

Model 3: Evidence, Sentiment, and
Jury Closeness
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cases are close on the evidence they agree with the judge that the defendant
is guilty 87% of the time and that the defendant is not guilty 4% of the time
(for a total agreement of 91%).
We now turn to the heart of our inquiry—examining if and how
evidentiary and non-evidentiary factors explain disagreements between
judges and juries. Our particular interest is examining whether “jury
sentiment” toward the law and the defendant can be identified as an
explanation for judge–jury disagreement in the modern NCSC data. Since
case outcome is a multi-category variable representing judge and jury
agreement or disagreement about conviction or acquittal, here, we use
multinomial regression analysis to help isolate the degree to which
variables illustrative of jury sentiment affect outcomes in those cases in
which judges and juries disagree on the verdict. In order to arrive at some
understanding of the role of sentiment, we also examine the effect of a
range of other possible contributors to disagreement. We calculate three
multinomial models to predict the independent effect of evidence and jury
sentiment on case outcomes. The first model predicts the effect of evidence
and jury sentiment on outcomes excluding measures of judge and jury
evaluation of whether or not the case was close. The second model
examines the effects of evidence and juror sentiment controlling for judge
assessment of the case closeness while the third model controls for jury
perceptions of case closeness. In all three models, the comparison category
for the dependent variable is judge and jury agreement on conviction,
meaning that the coefficients for agreement on acquittal and disagreement
on conviction or acquittal are measured against agreement on conviction.
The results from the multinomial models are set forth in Table 3. To
simplify the presentation of results, the outcomes for cases indicative of the
liberation hypothesis (where the jury acquits when the judge would have
convicted) are highlighted in grey and a majority of the discussion of
findings centers around predictors of these “liberation” cases.
Model 1 indicates some difference in judge–jury agreement between
study sites. Cases in Maricopa and Los Angeles cases were less likely than
cases in Washington D.C. (the reference category) to result in jury
acquittals when the judge would have convicted. As demonstrated in
previous research, 72 when the defendant had no criminal record juries were
more likely to acquit when judges would convict as compared to agreement
on conviction (b=1.996, p=.001). While the total number of prosecution
and defense witnesses did not strongly predict judge and jury disagreement,
judges and juries were significantly more likely to agree on acquittal when
the defense presented a strong case in terms of having a supporting witness
72

Givelber & Farrell, supra note 51, at 40–43 & tbl.2.
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testify (alone or in combination with the defendant, b=1.450, p=.010) and
when the defendant claimed he was innocent (b=1.344, p=.005). One
possible explanation for both phenomena is that defendants most likely
insist upon innocence in those cases where there is strong evidentiary basis
for doing so. Moreover, a defense lawyer with a client insisting on
innocence and witnesses to help prove his case may be more energized to
put on an effective defense. There are no significant effects of defendant
race, jury race, or charge severity on differences in case outcomes.
Since we hypothesized that jury sentiment would distinguish cases
where judges and juries disagree on the outcome, we should anticipate a
significant relationship between jury sentiment variables (belief that the law
is unfair and sympathy for the defendant) and the coefficients for
disagreement in the multinomial models. Specifically, we should find the
strongest positive relationship between both sentiment variables and jury
acquittals occurring in liberation cases—where the judge would convict
when the jury acquits. Model 1 illustrates that jury sentiment toward the
law has a significant positive effect on all examined outcomes. That is,
when juries perceive the law or the correct legal outcome to be unfair, it is
significantly more likely that (a) the jury will acquit even if the judge would
convict (b=.928, p=.003), (b) the judge and jury will agree on acquittal
(b=.827, p=.008), or (c) the judge will indicate that she would have
acquitted even if the jury convicts (b=1.095, p=.005) than it is that (d) the
jury will convict and the judge agrees. Therefore, while sentiment toward
the law does predict disagreement, it also significantly predicts judge and
jury agreement about acquittal. Contrary to the prediction of the liberation
hypothesis, in the cases where the jury expresses sympathy for the
defendant, jurors are less likely to acquit when the judge would convict (b=.967, p=.002) than they are to agree with the judge that the defendant is
guilty. As we suggested earlier, this may be because juries feel less
sympathy for a defendant whom they are going to acquit.
Adding judicial perception of case-closeness into the second model,
we find that cases are not more likely to result in disagreement when the
judge indicates that the case is close on the evidence than otherwise. More
importantly, adding judge perceptions about the closeness of the case does
not dramatically alter the relationships between jury sentiment and case
outcomes observed in Model 1. However, adding jury perceptions of casecloseness in Model 3 both improves the strength of the model and changes
the effect of some important predictors of disagreement. Initially, the
amount of variance explained in the model increases when jury perceptions
of closeness are included (pseudo r-square measures improve from .48 in
Model 1 and Model 2 to .59 in Model 3). Jury perception of closeness also
significantly predicts judge and jury disagreement (acquitting when the
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judge would convict, b=3.364, p=.000) and jury agreement with the judge
on acquittal (b=2.703, p=.000). Evidentiary factors such as the defendant’s
lack of a criminal history still strongly predict judge and jury disagreement
(b=2.509, p=.000), but jury sentiment toward the law is no longer a
significant predictor of judge–jury disagreement. While jury sentiment
toward the defendant remains a significant predictor of judge–jury
disagreement, the direction of the effect is opposite to that predicted by the
liberation hypothesis.
The liberation hypothesis posits that jurors who disagreed with the
judge by acquitting someone the judge believed guilty were responding to
sentiment in cases that were close on the evidence. If this proposition holds
true today, we should expect that the effects of jury sentiment toward the
law and the defendant should be strongest in those cases that are close on
the evidence. We test this contention directly by partitioning the NCSC
data by both judge perceptions of closeness (close or clear) and jury
perceptions of closeness (close or clear) and reexamining the effects of jury
sentiment on case outcomes in close and clear cases separately. As we
noted in the discussion of Table 2, cases that the jury believes are clear
generally generate agreement between the judge and jury and cases that are
close generate disagreement. This does not necessarily mean that we can
assume “sentiment” is more influential in close cases than it is in clear
cases. Indeed, sentiment may affect jury decisionmaking in different ways
in cases that either the judge or the jury believes are close compared to
those that are believed to be clear. Although nearly one-quarter of the
instances of judge–jury disagreements identified in The American Jury
occurred in cases that the judge believed to be clear on the evidence, Kalven
and Zeisel never analyzed these cases separately to determine whether or
not jury sentiment also predicted judge–jury disagreement in clear cases. 73
The present analysis attempts to remedy this omission, providing a more
complete evaluation of the role of jury sentiments play in predicting judge
and jury disagreement in both close and clear cases.

73

Because the second survey was the one which asked the judge whether the case was
“close” or “clear,” it seems likely that the figures about disagreement in “clear” cases are
based on that survey. They do not discuss disagreements in “clear” cases as a distinct
category although they note that as a matter of theory disagreements in “clear” cases should
be disagreements based exclusively on values, a phenomenon which they identify as
occurring in 24% of all cases in both surveys. They note that the second survey indicated
that disagreements occurred in 25% of all cases that the judge designated as clear. Id. at
164 n.2. The figure for all disagreements (both normal and cross-over) in Kalven and Zeisel
was 22%. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 58 tbl.12.
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Multinomial models predicting the effects of evidentiary and jury
sentiment measures on case outcomes 74 for cases that judges indicate are
“not close” and cases that judges indicate are “close” on the evidence 75 are
displayed in the first two columns of Table 4. As suggested by the
liberation hypothesis, when the judge considered the case to be close on the
evidence, jury sentiment about the fairness of the law predicts that the jury
will acquit when the judge would convict (b=.702, p=.027). Sentiment,
however, is not the only significant predictor of judge jury disagreement in
cases that judges indicate are close on the evidence. The defendant’s lack
of a criminal record also significantly predicts judge–jury disagreement in
the direction of liberation (b=1.101, p=.043), suggesting both sentiment and
evidentiary factors influence juries to acquit when judges would convict in
cases that judges believe are close on the evidence. Interestingly, jury
sentiment about the defendant and the lack of a defendant’s criminal history
also predict judge–jury disagreement in cases that the judge indicates are
not close on the evidence, indicating that evidence and sentiment may also
be at work in clear cases as well.76
The last two columns of Table 4 present the effect of measures of
evidence and jury sentiment on judge–jury disagreement in cases the jury
thinks are not close compared to cases the jury thinks are close on the
evidence. While jury sentiment about the law predicted judge–jury
disagreement when the judge thought the case was close, there is no
relationship between jury sentiment about the law or the defendant and case

74

To simplify the interpretation the partitioned multinomial model results, we collapsed
case outcomes into three categories: judge and jury agree about conviction or acquittal
(reference category), judge would convict when jury acquits, and judge would acquit when
jury convicts. The strength and direction of key measures are then same when agreement
cases are separated into agreement on acquittal and agreement on conviction (as presented in
Table 3) and results from these more complex models are available upon request from
authors. Models show here are also limited to key variables measuring evidence and jury
sentiment.
75
Judges and juries were each asked to rate the degree to which the evidence favored the
prosecution or defense on a 1 to 7 scale (1 indicating evidence favored the prosecution and 7
indicating evidence favored defense). The responses were recoded into not close (coded 0
when the judge or jury indicated an answer at the ends of the scale of 1–2 or 6–7), and close
(coded 1 when the judge or jury indicated an answer in the middle of the scale of 3, 4, or 5).
76
We used a coefficient comparison test to examine differences in the coefficients across
partitioned close and not close models for judges and juries (for more information about the
z-value test. See Raymond Paternoster et al., Using the Correct Statistical Test for the
Equality of Regression Coefficients, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 859, 859. (1998) (computation of Z =
b1 – b2/√ SEb12 + SEb22). While the strength of some evidentiary and jury sentiment
measures differed between cases that judges thought were close compared to those cases that
judges did not think were close, none of these differences were large enough to be
statistically significant. Z-score calculations are available from the authors upon request.
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p <.01; reference category is judge and jury agreement (agreement about conviction and agreement about acquittal combined).

.342

-.048***
(.086)**

-.019***
(.057)**

Prosecution witnesses & exhibits

B/(SE)

B/(SE)
-.344***
(.171)**

Judge acquits,
jury convicts,

Judge Perception
Judge convicts,
jury acquits

Not Close

.014***
(.014)**

Pseudo R-Square (Nagelkerke)

Table 4
Partitioned Multinomial Models Predicting Judge and Jury Disagreement
by Jury and Judge Assessments of Case-Closeness
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outcomes in those cases that the jury thinks are close on the evidence. The
only variable that predicts judge–jury disagreement in the direction of
liberation in cases that the jury thinks are close on the evidence is a
defendant’s lack of a criminal record (b=1.342, p=.009). Jurors, then, were
least likely to be influenced by sentiment in the very cases that the
liberation hypothesis suggests that sentiment should matter most—when
they believed the case to be close on the evidence. While jury sentiments
toward the law and to a lesser degree (and in the opposite direction of that
predicted by Kalven and Zeisel) toward the defendant help predict cases
where the jury and judge disagree about guilt generally, these factors only
predict disagreement in a limited number of cases. Specifically, sentiment
toward the law only predicts liberation (jury acquittal when the judge would
convict) in cases where the judge thinks the evidence is close and sentiment
toward the defendant negatively predicts liberation only in cases that judges
believe are not close on the evidence. Jury sentiment toward the law or the
defendant has no effect on case outcomes when the jury considers the case
close. While this result seems logical—sentiments should help explain why
judge and jury disagree when one or the other of them considers the case to
be clear—it provides little support for a theory that suggests evidentiary
uncertainty triggers the jury’s retreat to sentiment. Ultimately, the strongest
and most consistent predictor of jury acquittal in opposition to a judge’s
vote for conviction is a defendant without a criminal record. At least in the
NCSC data, the evidentiary factor of a criminal history has a much stronger
influence than jury sentiment in predicting judge–jury disagreements.
V. CONCLUSION
This study has explored the question “What accounts for judge and
jury disagreement about guilt?” with a particular focus upon whether jury
sentiments about the defendant and the law offer a significant explanation
of the phenomenon. Kalven and Zeisel explained disagreements in part
through the liberation hypothesis that juries, in close cases, resorted to
sentiment in deciding whether the defendant was guilty. Empirical research
over the past forty years has been unable to replicate these findings,
offering mixed evaluations of the role to which jury sentiment as opposed
to evidentiary factors explain cases in which the jury acquits defendants
whom the judge would have convicted. To see whether we could find
evidence of this phenomenon at work, we looked at the data from a fourjurisdiction survey of criminal trials, undertaken for the explicit purpose of
analyzing hung juries but employing survey instruments and techniques
permitting inquiry into a broader set of questions. While earlier research
analyzing this data confirmed that contemporary juries, like those studied
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by Kalven and Zeisel, were more acquittal prone than judges, 77 our analysis
indicates that sentiments, as measured by the NCSC study, do not provide a
particularly meaningful explanation of the tendency of the jury to acquit
when the judge would convict. We find that contrary to the liberation
hypothesis, which indicates juries will resort to sentiment when the
evidence is close, jury sentiment toward the law has only has only a limited
effect in those cases where the judge believes the evidence is close. Indeed,
jury sentiment toward the law or the defendant is least likely to play a role
in the very situation in which the theory suggests it would have greatest
effect—when the jury finds the case close on the evidence.
The results presented here should not be completely surprising. There
should be some reason that a jury refuses to decide a case in the way that
the judge considers to be clear. It is interesting, but ultimately unsatisfying,
to speculate as to why Kalven and Zeisel did not discuss disagreements in
“clear” cases as separate categories. While they explicitly eschew the role
of advocate for or against the jury system, their work stands as a powerful
and reassuring testament to the justice of the jury system, as the many
judicial citations to it testify. 78 Perhaps they considered that an extensive
treatment of cases in which a jury’s decision apparently flies in the face of
evidence would have undercut their message. Whatever the reason, the data
presented here reveals, as did Kalven and Zeisel’s survey forty years earlier,
that there are a small but persistent fraction of jury trials that result in
verdicts that the judge considers to be counterfactual. The explanation for
these disagreements, however, appears to be more complex than the
liberation hypothesis suggests. In the face of evidentiary uncertainty, juries
do not appear to retreat to sentiment; rather, a more complex process of
weighing the value of evidence, including the criminal record of the
defendant appears to explain such disagreements.
This conclusion requires a number of qualifications. First, since the
NCSC study did not ask judges why juries disagree with them as to guilt,
we do not know whether contemporary judges would offer the same
explanation of disagreements that their counterparts offered in the 1950s. If
the NCSC asked the same questions as Kalven and Zeisel, perhaps it would
have received the same answers. Regardless, the NCSC data provides
superior measures of the factors that actually affect jury decisions and the
results presented here would still provide no support for the view that it is
particularly when the jury considers a case close that it will turn to
sentiment to decide the case. Additionally, the NCSC data is limited in a
number of ways that constrain the generalizability of our findings. The data
77
78

Eisenberg et al, supra note 11, at 181.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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include a relatively small number of criminal trials occurring in only four
jurisdictions, all of which are in urban settings. As a result, the findings
from this study, and concerns raised about the role of jury sentiment, may
not be generalizable to different types of locations.
It is possible, of course, that sentiment plays a significant role in
leading a juror to consider the case close on the evidence but that the jurors
who responded to the NCSC study were unaware of this subtle influence on
their perceptions. They answered in light of the vote they had just cast, and
they understood their vote in terms of resolving a factual dispute rather than
permitting sentiment to outweigh the conclusion that the facts demanded.
One could imagine that jurors might be more aware of the role of sentiment
when they chose to acquit despite clear evidence of guilt. Accepting both
of these premises, the findings presented here would not undermine the
liberation hypothesis but would not provide support for the view that factual
uncertainty opens a juror’s mind to consider sentiment rather than the other
way around. We cannot discount the possibility that the juror’s failure to
acknowledge the role of sentiment in the liberation outcome reflected their
inability to understand their own emotions rather than the absence of those
emotions. However, we can suggest that, if this is the case, it has yet to be
demonstrated convincingly. In our view, the data rather supports the less
exciting possibility that, in close cases, jurors acquit because they believe
that, on the evidence presented, the state has failed to persuade them of the
defendant’s guilt. In fact, the evidentiary factor of a defendant without a
criminal history is the strongest predictor of judge and jury disagreement in
cases that both judges and juries indicate are close on the evidence.
The liberation hypothesis suggests that when juries disagree with
judges, they do so out of emotion, invoked in those cases that are close on
the evidence. This hypothesis has remained largely untested for over forty
years and arguably has supported commonly held impressions about the
unique role of the American jury—that in the face of evidentiary
uncertainty, jurors employ personal and community sentiment to arrive at
acquittals of defendants whom judges believe to be guilty. The findings
presented here suggest that that when juries decide to acquit in cases in
which judges would have convicted, they do not arrive at this decision
because of sentiment, but rather do so because they evaluate the evidence
differently than judges. Thus, we should understand differences between
judges and juries not as evidence of the jury’s “flight from the law,” but
rather as an indication that judges and juries rationally evaluate the same
evidence but arrive at different conclusions based on their unique vantage
points.
Ultimately, it is less important to understand why judges and juries
disagree than to understand who is correct in those cases where they do
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disagree. Even if juries are not moved by sentiment, it is still possible that
judges do a better job than juries do at evaluating credibility and weighing
the evidence. If so, it may be that the judge’s conclusion as to guilt or
innocence is the one that reflects the most accurate application of law to
fact. There is no way to answer that question definitively. However, we
can answer the question of whether the jury arrives at conclusions different
from the judge in close cases because they are unusually susceptible to
sentiment in such cases. The answer to that question (at least as measured
by the data presented here) is “no.” This finding has important implications
for how we think about the meaning of acquittals. If courts and other
criminal justice professionals are going to continue to treat jury acquittals as
irrelevant to the question of whether the defendant committed the crime,
they are going to need a firmer base than the belief that juries are moved by
sentiment and judges by fact.

